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Abstract
This paper's aims are concerned with the effects of information security 
technologies upon society in general and civil society organisations in particular. 
Information security mechanisms have the potential to act as enablers or 
disablers for the work of civil society groups. Recent increased emphasis on 
national security issues by state actors, particularly ‘anti-terrorism’ initiatives, 
have resulted in legislative instruments that impinge upon the civil liberties of 
many citizens and have the potential to restrict the free flow of information vital 
for civil society actors. The nascent area of cyberactivism, or hactivism, is at risk 
of being labelled cyberterrorism, with the accompanying change of perception 
from a legitimate form of electronic civil disobedience to an abhorrent crime. 
Biometric technology can be an invasive intrusion into citizens’ privacy. Internet 
censorship and surveillance is widespread and increasing. These 
implementations of information security technology are becoming more widely 
deployed with profound implications for the type of societies that will result.
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Introduction
Information security impacts upon society in positive and negative ways. Nation states 
such as Australia are increasingly becoming dependent on information infrastructures 
relied upon by corporate, government and non-government organisations and 
individuals. In many regards, information security technologies are deployed for the 
betterment of society and are used to protect important, sensitive information from 
unwanted disclosure, modification or fabrication. An example is the use of 
cryptographic software tools that are used to protect sensitive and potentially 
incriminating information gathered by human rights field workers and investigators. 
Information security technologies are also deployed in ways which adversely affect 
society. Systems of Internet censorship and surveillance use information security 
technology. The lines between some forms of online activism and cyberterrorism are 
becoming increasingly blurred. Biometrics, the measure of an individual’s physiological 
or behavioural attributes, can be a violation of one’s privacy. Important components of 
civil society such as environmental, social justice and human rights non-government 
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organisations (NGOs) are at particular risk. Such NGOs are subject to the same 
untargeted attacks that every other Internet user faces such as viruses and phishing 
scams. They are also at risk of targeted attacks because of the work they perform, the 
manner in which they perform it and the nature of their opponents. 
The deployment of increased security measures is frequently accompanied by a 
justification stressing the need to address threats to national security, especially what is 
frequently referred to as terrorism. In a climate of fear and loathing it is easier for 
governments to introduce contentious legislative changes in the name of counter-
terrorism. This tactic is not new. In 1946 Herman Goering succinctly described the 
importance of the propaganda war in convincing the populace they are under threat 
and that war is necessary and unavoidable. For most of its reign the Nazi regime was 
operating under what Giorgio Agamben describes as a ‘state of exception’ which was 
enacted by Hitler and suspended the civil liberties enshrined in the Weimar Constitution 
(Agamben, 2005). This suspension of the usual juridicial environment made it easier for 
the Nazi leaders to wield power as they saw fit, ostensibly to protect the German 
people (or at least the subset of German people that continued to be recognised as 
legitimate citizens). 
Usually the tension between reductions in civil liberties and the increase in state power 
is solved by temporarily increasing state power. Once the conflict or crisis is resolved 
state power is reverted back to its original level (Morgan, 2004). But what of the conflict 
or crisis that has no end? Has the ‘war on drugs’, championed by a number of US 
presidents, been won yet? The parallels with the war currently being waged around the 
world the ‘war on terror’, are profound and disturbing. The danger of the obsession by 
many nation states in maintaining ‘security’ by fighting the war on terror is that this 
becomes the most valued measure of a government’s performance, insofar as the 
government defines its own performance criteria. As Agamben states: “A state which 
has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can 
always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.” (Agamben, 2002). 
Internet Filtering: Censorship In Action 
Internet censorship occurs in different forms. Nation states such as Vietnam, Iran and 
China deploy national level Internet filtering systems to limit access to Web sites 
containing material deemed to be unacceptable to the state. Organisations such as 
businesses and government departments deploy organisational-level Internet filtering 
systems to stop employees accessing material that would violate acceptable-use 
policies. PC-based Internet filtering products are increasingly being marketed towards 
parents as a way of monitoring and safeguarding their children's access to the Internet.  
Filtering is the main process involved with Internet censorship. The ways in which 
filtering is performed are blacklisting, whitelisting and content analysis (Klang, 2005). 
Blacklists are effectively lists of banned Web sites. Access to a Web site in the blacklist 
is usually blocked by the filtering software. Whitelists are effectively lists of allowed 
Web sites. Usually access is limited to only the Web sites in the whitelist and this 
approach has limited scope. Content analysis does not use lists of Web sites but relies 
on real-time analysis of content to identify material that is unacceptable and is blocked.  
Compiling and updating blacklists is a considerable overhead and usually involves 
abrogating responsibility to another party such as the software producer. While some 
blacklisting systems allow the user to add to the supplied lists, the majority use a list 
supplied by the software creator. Commercial Internet filtering companies usually do 
not allow public scrutiny of the blacklists they compile, which can lead to issues of lack 
of transparency and public accountability when such products are used without the 
knowledge or consent of the user population they are designed to protect or control, 
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depending on one’s perspective. The formats of the blacklists are usually encrypted to 
prevent scrutiny of their content.
Given the overheads of list maintenance and the value of the accuracy and timeliness 
of the list it is not surprising that companies wish to keep their contents a trade secret. 
The challenge for companies categorising Web sites is the massive number of Web 
sites on the Internet and the dynamic nature of Web site addresses, content and 
growth. While many Internet filtering companies claim to include human checking of 
their blacklists, it is highly unlikely that this is conducted to any significant extent 
(Electronic Frontier Foundation & Online Policy Group, 2003).  
A number of empirical studies conducted in recent years have found significant errors 
in underblocking and overblocking performance of Internet filtering products (Edelman, 
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation & Online Policy Group, 2003; Greenfield, 
Rickwood, & Tran, 2002; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2002; NetAlert Limited, 2006). 
Underblocking errors occur when Web sites that should be blocked are not. 
Overblocking errors occur when Web sites that should not be blocked are (Edelman, 
2001). One of the dangers of overblocking is that ‘legitimate’ content is deemed 
objectionable, such as the categorisation of many pages on Amnesty International’s 
Web site as being of a sexual nature (Haselton, 2000).  
Web proxy programmes such as The Circumventor have been specifically designed to 
bypass Internet censorship controls and are free to use (Haselton, 2004). The 
Circumventor system works as a number of Web proxy servers. Each Circumventor 
site provides a Web site with a form in which the Web site address is entered that the 
user ultimately wishes to view but is unable to due to Internet filtering. Upon submitting 
the form the Circumventor proxy server retrieves the required Web site and displays it 
to the user. Any Internet filtering software installed on the user’s PC or ISP only sees 
Web site traffic being sent to and from the Circumventor sites rather than the Web site 
that is actually being ‘viewed’ by the user. As Circumventor sites are created by 
ordinary Internet users who have volunteered to install a Circumventor site on their PC, 
the addresses of these sites are not initially known to the companies that produce 
Internet filtering software. Every few days the Circumventor operators send out an 
email message detailing new Circumventor sites, thus staying ahead of the Internet 
filtering software companies until they update their blacklists so that their users can 
update the Internet filtering software. 
Government Surveillance 
One of the results of the increased emphasis by nation states on security measures 
has been an increase in government surveillance. In the United States, many were 
shocked to discover the extent of the “massive and illegal” wiretapping operation 
carried out by AT&T for the National Security Agency (NSA) (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2006a). The surveillance operation was authorised by an executive order 
of President George W. Bush in 2002, without obtaining a warrant or court order that is 
usually required for such wiretapping activities. 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) launched a class-action lawsuit against AT&T 
in January, 2006 alleging AT&T broke communications privacy laws in allowing 
government agencies access to phone and Internet communications as well as the 
massive 300 Terabyte “Daytona” database of caller information (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2006a). One of the more interesting, though not surprising, aspects of this 
case is the United States government’s legal attempts to stop public scrutiny of the 
issue. On May 15, 2006, the U.S government filed a classified motion to immediately 
stop the EFF lawsuit proceeding (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2006c). As the motion 
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contained classified material the contents could not be publicly disclosed but a 
redacted, public version disclosed the reasoning behind the motion was “because any 
judicial inquiry into whether AT&T broke the law could reveal state secrets and harm 
national security” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2006c). In effect, the U.S 
government was arguing that they were above the law. The motion was dismissed by a 
federal judge on July 20, 2006 and the case is proceeding (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2006b). 
In a related case, on August 18, 2006 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was 
successful in a lawsuit against the NSA alleging that the wiretapping carried out by the 
organisation breached the First and Fourth Amendments to the US Constitution which 
protect free speech and privacy (American Civil Liberties Union, 2006a). The federal 
court called for an immediate end to the warrantless wiretapping programme conducted 
by the NSA. A number of social justice organisations supported the lawsuit, including 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (American Civil Liberties Union, 2006b). 
The U.S federal government mounted similar arguments in the ACLU lawsuit as they 
have in the EFF lawsuit, stating that the President has executive powers which override 
any law in a time of war. The U.S Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, was quoted 
following the court’s decision as saying: ”I believe very strongly that the president does 
have the authority to authorize this kind of conduct in a time - particularly in a time of 
war.” (Holahan & Kopecki, 2006). The U.S government will appeal the decision. 
In January, 2006 the U.S government asked the search engines Yahoo!, MSN, 
America Online and Google to supply them with details of users’ searches (Fisher, 
2006). Allegedly the government originally wanted three months worth of search data 
and the Web site addresses to every entry in the search engines’ indexes. Both 
demands were negotiated down to one week’s worth of search data and one million 
randomly chosen Web site addresses. It appears that Google was the only company to 
fight the subpoena by refusing to supply the requested data, which was allegedly 
wanted to aid the government’s attempts to regulate online pornography. This refusal 
to cooperate by Google stands in contrast with their willingness to comply with the 
Chinese government’s requirements for Internet censorship for a search engine to 
operate in mainland China.  
China is a good example of how information security technology can impact upon 
society in general and civil society organisations in particular. The system of Internet 
surveillance and censorship in China is the most advanced ever seen (OpenNet 
Initiative, 2005). China’s Internet censorship and surveillance regime covers a wide 
variety of content including Web sites, blogs (Web logs), on-line discussion forums, 
university bulletin board systems and e-mail messages.  
Online discussion forums and bulletin boards are very popular in China, and constitute 
the freest form of media (Reporters Without Borders, 2003). Censorship of content 
posted to discussion forums is filtered through automated keyword filtering and 
additional manual checking by forum Webmasters (OpenNet Initiative, 2005). The 
forum Webmasters are often unpaid volunteers who “try to steer what they consider 
negative conversations in a positive direction with well-placed comments of their own” 
(French, 2006). ‘Negative conversations’ include political material, whereas an example 
of a positive discussion topic is “what celebrities make the best role models” (French, 
2006).
The core of the Internet architecture is the Internet backbone. All Internet traffic to or 
from China is routed through a series of proxy gateways that interconnect China’s 
networks to the greater Internet backbone. It is at these proxy gateways that the main 
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component of China’s Internet censorship mechanisms are implemented (Walton, 
2001). Specific details are difficult to obtain, though empirical testing has revealed 
consistent filtering and blocking of access to Web sites and email messages which 
contain material deemed offensive by the Chinese authorities (Diebert & Villeneuve, 
2005; OpenNet Initiative, 2005; Zittrain & Edelman, 2003). Topics which are 
consistently blocked include material relating to the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, pro-democracy and human rights in China 
(OpenNet Initiative, 2005). 
One of the criticisms of China is not just that it performs Internet censorship but the 
severe and unjust sentences imposed on some of its citizens as a result of breaching 
regulations on Internet expression. For example, Huang Qi was detained for three 
years prior to his sentencing to five years in prison in 2003 (Amnesty International, 
2004). His ‘crime’ was to host a Web site on which ‘cyber dissidents’ outside China 
posted articles critical of the Chinese government. Journalist Shi Tao was arrested as a 
result of Yahoo! providing information to Chinese authorities after he sent an email 
message detailing a censorship crackdown by the government (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2004). Mr Tao was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for “divulging state 
secrets”. There are many other similar examples in the literature. 
The Chinese regime has been able to implement the system of Internet censorship and 
surveillance with the help of Western information technology companies such as Cisco 
Systems, Sun Microsystems and Nortel Networks, who have provided equipment and 
software (Walton, 2001). Companies including Yahoo!, MSN and Google aid the 
regime by filtering the results of their search engines hosted inside China. Microsoft 
implements automated censorship mechanisms in their China-based blog site (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006).
Such IT companies claim that they have no choice as they are subject to the rules and 
regulations of the Chinese Authorities (Boot, 2005). The senior vice president of 
Microsoft, Craig Mundie’s cavalier statement of: “The companies that do business here 
have to deal with the legal environment as it is but I think it is, in my view, widely 
overstated to think that the Chinese citizen today isn't benefiting from access to the 
Internet” is indicative (AFX News Limited, 2006).  
The “legal environment” referred to by Mr Mundie is not as clear as it may appear. The 
censorship and surveillance system is a violation of the Chinese peoples’ basic human 
rights enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Of 
particular relevance are Articles 12 (protection of privacy), 18 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion) and 20 (freedom of association). Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is particularly relevant, defining freedom 
of opinion and expression. China is a signatory to the ICCPR. As a signatory, they 
have “an obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the object and 
the purpose of the treaty” (Thompson, 2006; United Nations). Fundamental freedoms 
such as “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession 
and of demonstration”, as well as freedom of religion and the right to privacy are 
expressly protected in China’s constitution ("Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China," 1982). 
The wave of negative publicity surrounding Google’s operations in China in the western 
media, particularly the information technology specific media, frequently mentioned the 
ethical dilemma that faced Google. Specifically, the central question asked was 
whether Google was, on balance, aiding the Chinese people by providing a limited 
access to their services or was simply part of the problem by aiding a regime of 
censorship and control. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International were quite strident in their criticism of Google being part of the 
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problem and adding legitimacy to the system of censorship through their participation 
(Amnesty International, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
Numerous Web logs, newspaper articles and Web sites in the information technology 
area have mentioned how difficult it was for Google’s executives to make the decision 
to operate inside mainland China and by doing so, becoming part of the censorship 
regime (Baker, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2006; Maich, 2006; Thompson, 2006). Their 
justification is summed up by one of the co-founders of Google, Serge Brin:  
“We ultimately made a difficult decision, but we felt that by participating there, and 
making our services more available, even if not to the 100 percent that we ideally 
would like, that it will be better for Chinese Web users, because ultimately they 
would get more information, though not quite all of it.” quoted in (Kirkpatrick, 2006). 
Amid all the apparent hand-wringing there is no indication that the ethical question of 
doing business with a totalitarian regime with a significant history of human rights 
abuses was considered, quite apart from censorship and surveillance practices. Even if 
Google was not censoring its search results, the fact that it is a very high profile 
example of the importance of doing business in China lends legitimacy to the regime. It 
also reinforces the perception that many corporations’ overriding responsibility rests 
with making a profit regardless of the broader implications for society. 
Hacktivism and Cyberterrorism 
The modern use of the term “hack” as an activity of a technical nature, dates back to 
the activities of students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1960s 
(Anonymous, 2006). A hack was used to describe a simple, clever, solution to a 
problem, not necessarily involving computers. The person who created and performed 
the hack was therefore described as a hacker. In the 1980s the term hacker began to 
be used to describe a person gaining unauthorised access to a computer system, 
denoting a criminal activity involving the use of computers. For many computer 
enthusiasts however, the use of the term “hacking” to describe a criminal act is a 
misuse of the term and “cracking” should be used instead (Stallman, 2002). This 
distinction is almost universally ignored, even by authors who are aware of the 
controversy over the terminology. 
Hacktivism is defined by Manion and Goodrum as “the (sometimes) clandestine use of 
computer hacking to help advance political causes” (Manion & Goodrum, 2000). As it is 
a combination of the terms ‘hacking’ and ‘activism’ it is not surprising that the context in 
which the term ‘hacktivism’ is used varies broadly between having positive or negative 
connotations. One of the fundamental principles of hacktivism is that it should be non-
violent in nature (Manion & Goodrum, 2000). 
Language has tremendous power. The labelling of hacktivist activities as 
‘cyberterrorism’ blurs the distinction between an act of electronic civil disobedience and 
a malicious act designed to cause harm. Denning defines cyberterrorism as “politically 
motivated hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or 
severe economic damage” (Denning, 2001). In the current climate of fear and loathing 
surrounding the imminent threat of terrorism, any linking of activist activities with 
terrorism can be extremely damaging to the hacktivist cause.  
In Australian legislation the distinction between acts which could be described as 
hacktivism and those that could be described as cyberterrorism is not clear. The 
Criminal Code Act 1995 defines an action or threat of action as terrorism if it “is made 
with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause” and where the 
  7
action: “…(f) seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic 
system including, but not limited to: (i) an information system; or (ii) a 
telecommunications system; or (iii) a financial system; or (iv) a system used for the 
delivery of essential government services; or (v) a system used for, or by, an essential 
public utility; or (vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system” ("An Act relating to the 
criminal law", 1995).
The use of the terms “seriously interferes with” and “information system” is sufficiently 
broad and vague that they could be easily used to describe acts of civil disobedience 
such as ‘electronic sit-ins’. Traditionally the term ‘sit-in’ described an act of civil 
disobedience in which one or more people occupied a public space in protest, often 
with the intention of causing disruption to normal operations of activities carried out in 
that space. The sit-ins conducted by African-American students in segregated 
restaurants in the early days of the civil rights movement in the United States are well-
known examples of this non-violent form of protest.
Protest actions of a similar intent as sit-ins, conducted via the Internet with Web sites 
as the target are known as ‘electronic sit-ins’ or ‘virtual sit-ins’. One of the first 
examples of electronic sit-ins was carried out against various Web sites of the French 
government in December 1995 (Denning, 2001). The electronic sit-in was conducted to 
protest against French government policies on nuclear and social issues. It was carried 
out by the protest organisers encouraging people around the world to simultaneously 
attempt to access the Web sites of the target government agencies via users’ Web 
browsers.
The goal of the electronic sit-in is to generate so much protest traffic at the target Web 
site that it is difficult for legitimate traffic to get through. This technique is a type of 
‘denial of service’ attack. When the source of the spurious traffic is distributed amongst 
many computing hosts the effect is greatly magnified and is known as a distributed 
denial of service attack or DDoS attack. Software tools to launch coordinated DDoS 
attacks are readily available on the Internet and easy to use. The first high-profile 
example of the use of DDoS tools occurred in February 2000 when eBay, Amazon and 
CNN Web sites were attacked and effectively disabled for a number of hours 
(Neumann, 2000). The tools used to launch these attacks were designed to cause as 
much disruption to the target as possible and to evade detection by spoofing (faking) 
the source of the attack traffic. DDoS attacks are commonplace on the Internet today 
but are now longer as effective at causing major disruptions to high-profile targets, 
largely as a result of defence mechanisms enacted since early 2000. 
By comparison, software tools designed to conduct electronic sit-ins are usually not 
designed to cause the same level of disruption as DDoS tools and usually do not 
attempt to hide the source of the traffic (Denning, 2001). Electronic sit-ins are usually 
designed to draw attention to the issue behind the protest action rather than simply to 
cause havoc for havoc’s sake. In the eyes of many in the hacktivist community this 
distinction is an important one. It could also be an important factor in any judicial 
proceedings brought against people carrying out electronic sit-ins, though this 
distinction is not reflected in Australian legislation.  
Traditionally, the three most important information security principles are confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Availability is the principle of making available a resource for 
legitimate use. When a computer system is the subject of a denial of service attack it is 
the availability of the resource which is compromised. It could be argued therefore, that 
an electronic sit-in which hampers or temporarily stops legitimate access to a 
government Web site could constitute an act of terrorism in the Australian legal context. 
This has serious implications for restrictions in a fundamental component of a 
participatory democracy; the right to protest. Even if the law itself is not actually applied 
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in criminal proceedings there is potential for the chilling effect of the legislation to 
silence dissent. 
Biometrics
Biometrics is an application of information security technology which has enormous 
potential to adversely impact upon civil liberties, particularly the right to privacy. 
Examples of biometric measures include fingerprint, iris and retina patterns, and voice, 
gait and facial recognition. A number of empirical studies have shown serious problems 
with the accuracy of many biometric applications and their usability in real-world 
scenarios (Chandra & Calderon, 2005). A great deal of research into biometric systems 
is underway, with the US government in particular heavily sponsoring research in the 
application of biometrics for identification purposes. 
The distinction between authentication and identification is crucial when examining 
biometrics from a privacy perspective. Authentication is the process of proving a 
claimed identity. It is a one-to-one matching process. Identification is attempting to 
recognise or establish an individual’s identity. It is a one-to-many matching process.  
A biometric process which is used for authentication purposes is generally less 
intrusive, in privacy terms, than an identification process. For example, a biometric 
identifier such as a fingerprint template can be stored on a passport. In such a system, 
when a person presents their passport for checking they also have their fingerprint 
scanned. If the live scan matches the fingerprint template stored on the passport there 
is a high probability that the two biometric measures come from the same person. 
There may also be a high probability that the passport holder is who they claim to be. 
This is completely dependent on the security and accuracy of the process of creating 
the passport, storage of the collected biometric templates and the live scanning of 
fingerprints. 
Facial recognition with biometric technology is often used as an identification process 
to aid security applications. For example, facial recognition software could be linked 
with security cameras in a public space. The software compares the images captured 
by the cameras with a database of the images of criminal suspects. Theoretically, if the 
software matches a live image with a stored image then it has identified an individual. 
This process can be conducted without the knowledge or consent of individuals. There 
are significant challenges in the accuracy of the process due to differences in lighting, 
camera focal length and facial angle between the stored images and the live captured 
images. There are also issues with people intentionally disguising themselves to avoid 
recognition.  
Biometric technology is not a security panacea but it is often marketed as such, 
especially in the area of airport security. Proponents often argue that accurate 
identification could stop some terrorist attacks but this argument fails to take into 
account the unknown attacker. If a person is not known to be a terrorist but has 
legitimate identification then biometrics will not stop an attack. The use of the 
technology may bring many innocent people under suspicion though. The infamous 
“No Fly” list maintained by the Transport Safety Authority in the US is a pertinent 
example of the dangers of errors in such systems. If an error occurs whereby a person 
who is not on a terrorist watch list  has a biometric attribute which is matched by the 
system to a person on such a list, they could find it extremely difficult to prove their 
innocence with potentially serious consequences for civil liberties.  
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Civil Society Organisations and Information Security 
The accurate and timely acquisition and dissemination of information is vital to the 
operations of civil society actors such as human rights, environmental and social justice 
NGOs and activists. Civil society organisations are a cornerstone of a participatory 
democracy. Such groups have made extensive and enthusiastic use of information 
technologies such as the Internet to aid their activities, though it is unclear if their 
information assets have had accompanying appropriate protection (Carey-Smith & 
May, 2006). Anecdotal evidence from conversations with an experienced information 
security consultant who wishes to remain anonymous clearly shows that many civil 
society NGOs have little idea of the importance of information security 
Two of the most important assets of civil society organisations are their information 
resources and their reputation. The significant damage to these key resources that can 
accompany a serious information security incident could threaten the ongoing 
operations of such organisations. Due to the diverse and often dangerous operating 
conditions under which many civil society organisations operate, particularly their field-
workers, they are often in positions of vulnerability.  
The vulnerabilities faced may be of an information security nature and of a personal 
security nature. In an information security sense, civil society organisations that are 
oppositional to powerful interests such as corporations and state actors or their proxy 
agents such as militia groups are likely to be the subject of targeted attacks from their 
adversaries. These attacks may attempt to destroy information resources or they may 
conduct electronic wiretapping in an attempt to gain important and sensitive information 
that could be of direct benefit to them and of direct detriment to the NGO’s field workers 
or clients.  
Many civil society organisations are under increasing pressures to provide services for 
their clients. The Australian Council of Social Service Australian Community Sector 
Survey 2006 found that respondent organisations’ increased expenditure outstripped 
their increased income and that more people in need were turned away during 2004-
2005 than in the previous twelve months (171,366 people turned away, 29% more than 
2003-2004), largely due to services operating at maximum capacity (Australian Council 
of Social Service, 2006).  Our hypothesis is that the increasing pressures upon many 
civil society NGOs are contributing to a lack of knowledge of the importance of 
information security management and therefore a lack of application in securing 
important information resources. Future research will address the validity of this 
hypothesis. 
Conclusion
Information security is inherently an ethically neutral technology. The manner in which 
this technology is deployed determines the effects on society. As national security 
concerns receive more and more priority from a range of state actors the potential 
effects of information security technology on society become broader. Governments in 
most societies are increasingly stressing the risks that terrorism presents to society. 
The danger of this emphasis is that governments effectively ‘paint themselves into a 
corner’ whereby they need to be seen to be taking action to counter the terrorist threat 
that they themselves have helped to promote.  
One way of publicly taking action is to introduce measures which are presented as 
high-technology solutions to security problems, such as the deployment of facial 
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recognition biometrics to aid airport security. The decrease in civil liberties, as well as 
the false sense of security that that can result from such deployments needs to be 
carefully examined to ascertain, on balance, whether society is actually losing the 
freedoms that governments are meant to be protecting.  
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